This paper analyzes the role of individual heterogeneity in the diffusion of a network technology. Using a detailed data set on the adoption of a new videoconferencing technology within a firm, we estimate a structural model of technology adoption and use. We find that employees have significant heterogeneity in both adoption costs and network benefits, and have preferences for diverse network. Using our estimates, we evaluate two counterfactual adoption policies, and find a policy of strategically targeting the right subtype for initial adoption can lead to a faster-growing and larger network than a policy of uncoordinated or diffuse adoption.
evolves over time, and how agents use the technology after joining the network. People vary in their net fixed costs of adopting the network technology, and weigh the expected present value of joining the network today against the opportunity costs of not adopting. This suggests that adoption is an optimal waiting problem. After someone has adopted the communications technology, they decide how to use it. We model the sequence of calls as a function of two forces: differences in utility each person receives from interacting with others; and a taste for "dynamic diversification," or the desire to interact with different people over a sequence of calls. Our model allows us to provide a rich description of how diversity in the characteristics of network subscribers affects motivations for adoption.
Second, we apply our model to detailed data on the diffusion and use of a videoconferencing technology within a large multinational investment bank. We have detailed data on all 2,169 potential adopters in the firm, from the time that the technology was first offered for installation up to the network's steady state three and half years later. Using data on 463,806 videoconferencing calls made using this technology, we estimate a model of calling preferences for 64 different types of employees in the firm. The bank deployed the technology in a laissez-faire manner: employees could install the technology at no cost to themselves, but were not compelled to adopt. This means that we can focus our attention on understanding how individual employees within the firm adopted the technology without having to model the firm's adoption policy. We use recently developed techniques for estimating dynamic games to recover parameters for our model of technology adoption and use within this firm.
Our approach to identification is novel, as our structural model allows us to identify network effects through ex-post calling behavior. If we used a reduced form approach to measure causal network effects we would need 64 valid instruments for each type of employee in the firm, which is infeasible.
Third, we use our estimates to simulate how two different technology adoption policies focused on initial adoption could affect the evolution and use of the network over time. These policies represent potential deployment strategies that a firm or network operator can use to avoid sub-optimal diffusion for their technology. Under the first policy, the firm targets one type of employee as the initial set of technology adopters. This policy is common in many real-world settings, since firms commonly roll out a new technology in a specific work group, such as among all IT staff, before allowing wider adoption throughout the organization. In the second policy, the firm adopts a uniform adoption strategy, where the technology is spread equally across various types in the initial period. This type of policy can be more effective when employees value being able to communicate with a wide variety of other employees.
Comparing these two policies to the baseline case of decentralized adoption will allow us to evaluate the extent to which heterogeneity in employee behavior and characteristics must be accounted for in crafting an optimal policy for jump-starting the diffusion of a network technology.
Our paper makes several contributions to the existing literature on technology adoption and network effects. Despite the fact that technology adoption is a dynamic process, the empirical literature on network effects has been largely static in nature. For example, Rysman (2004) 's work on two-sided markets evaluates cross-sectional yellow pages data, while Ackerberg and Gowrisankaran (2006) 's assumption of free exit enables them to analyze the diffusion of electronic payments as a repeated static game. This orientation towards static models has been driven by three practical challenges. First, in technology adoption models with network effects, the researcher must confront the issue of multiple equilibria. Both Ackerberg and Gowrisankaran (2006) and Rysman (2004) tackle this by estimating which equilibrium out of a limited set is selected. It is also theoretically possible not to limit the set of potential equilibria, and to model explicitly the equilibrium selection process, as in Bajari, Hong and Ryan (2006b) . However, this approach requires the computation of all equilibria to a system, taking a prohibitive amount of time. This size of the state space is the second difficulty. In the present application, for example, the state space is an indicator function for each employee's adoption status. The number of possible combinations of these variables is 2 2169 , or approximately 10 602 . It is clear that is this an impossibly large set of points to enumerate, let alone compute equilibria over. However, by using the two-step techniques described by Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2006a) , we circumvent the problem of multiple equilibria and the curse of dimensionality which beset estimation of dynamic technology adoption games. Our results also contribute to a new literature which explicitly addresses issues of dynamics in technology adoption. One example is Schmidt-Dengler (2005)'s research on dynamic technology adoption timing in the presence of pre-emption effects. Einav (2004) also studies the introduction of new products from the firm's perspective and shows that dynamic estimation can reveal inefficiencies in timing. The focus of this previous literature has been on uncovering the drivers of adoption timing. We extend this by developing a generalized methodology for estimating demand for network goods.
In any research on network effects, identification is a key challenge.
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Much of the early empirical work focused identifying causal network effects network effects, for example Gowrisankaran and Stavins (2004) . Tucker (2006) and Tucker (2005) pursue a reduced-form approach using the same data as this paper. These papers exploit exogenous variation in videoconferencing adoption engendered by TV events such as the soccer World Cup, and document that network effects are both local and also asymmetric and heterogenous across informal and formal measures of employee importance in the firm. The crucial differences between this paper and these previous papers are that the network topology is used as a means of measuring employees' payoffs rather than as a source of identification, and that our structural estimates allow us to explore policy experiments. We are also able to explore a far broader spectrum of heterogeneity, because of the different approach we take to identification. Rather than trying explicitly to estimate a causal network effect, instead we structurally model the entire system of inter-related demand over time. This means that our estimates encompass all drivers of inter-dependent demand. These drivers include informational spillovers, employee coordination, and herding as well as causal network effects. This agnostic modeling approach resembles Bass (1969) since it allows for multiple mechanisms by which users influence each other's adoption.
Our model also allows us to model network usage after adoption: a problem which has not been explicitly tackled by the previous network effects literature. Existing discrete choice models are not appropriate for modeling an employee's sequential and interrelated choices governing which other employee to call over a given period. We propose a new "simulated sequence estimator" to deal with the twin challenges of predicting how many calls an employee will make and whom they will call.
Our primary finding is that heterogeneity is important for understanding adoption, calling behavior and changes in calling behavior over time. Employees in the firm have different tastes for making videoconferencing calls, depending on their location, job function, and rank. We find the pattern that, all else equal, each given subtype in the firm is more likely to call someone similar in the firm. However, allowing for dynamic diversification in tastes implies that this taste decreases in the number of times a call is made. Employees therefore have significant positive welfare gains from having access to a diverse network where there are employees of many types for them to call.
These results shed light on how communication in the firm operates across geography, job function, and rank. A burgeoning literature examines the role of hierarchies and communication in firms, e.g. Garicano and Hubbard (2003) and Garicano (2000) . While we find evidence that communication in the hierarchy is more likely between similar ranks in the firm, we observe communication across all regions, functions, and ranks. The complexity of the system of communication we uncover suggests that the highly stylized models of communication networks prevalent in the theoretical literature need extension to be capable of reproducing our results.
Using our estimates, we compared two commonly used technology management policies.
Reflecting the complex interplay between heterogeneity in network effects among employees in the firm and heterogeneity in adoption costs, we find that the policy with targeted interventions dominates the uniform adoption policy. The network that is seeded with one subtype grows faster and stays larger, by almost 20 percent, in the long run. Targeting should be used towards a subtype of employee that has both high adoption costs and large network effects on the adoption of others. By inducing this subtype to enter early, a targeted policy changes other employees' expectations about how the network will evolve. This leads to slightly more calls per adopter, and significantly higher overall welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the technology and data used in this study. Section 3 lays out a dynamic model of technology adoption choice and subsequent interaction choice. Section 4 discusses our estimation strategy. Section 5 discusses the results of our estimation. Section 6 reports results from a policy experiment to test two alternative technology adoption policies. Section 7 concludes and discusses directions for future work.
Technology and Data
We study adoption of a desktop-based videoconferencing technology within a single multinational bank. The primary benefit of videoconferencing is that it can improve the effec- the language of Farrell and Saloner (1985) , the videoconferencing technology has a "network use" of making high-quality videoconferencing calls to other adopters within the firm, and a "stand-alone use" of watching television on your desktop computer. As documented in Tucker (2007) , employees tended to use this technology to substitute for telephone calls.
Fewer than 5 percent of calls involved more than 2 people.
Two institutional details are central to our analysis. First, videoconferencing could only be used for internal communication within the firm. This means that we have comprehensive data on both the set of all potential adopters and how the technology was used after adoption. Second, the bank pursued an unusually laissez-faire approach to promotion and adoption of the technology in the firm. After the bank chose this technological standard to conduct internal videoconferencing, it invested in the basic network components which would form the backbone of the network infrastructure. The bank then publicized the availability of the technology to employees. Each employee independently decided if and when to order a videoconferencing unit from an external sales representative. The firm paid for all costs associated with the adoption. The videoconferencing vendor and bank employees have verified that there were no supply constraints which may have restricted adoption. Though such explicitly decentralized adoption is unusual, it is not uncommon for companies to install software or IT equipment for employees and then leave it to the employee's discretion whether or not they use it.
We combine two databases: personnel information for all employees as of March 2004; and complete records of videoconferencing adoption and use from the first call in January 2001 through August 2004. There were 2,169 employees who qualified as potential adopters, of which slightly over 1,600 eventually adopted the videoconferencing technology.
3 Based on data on each employee's job description, rank, and location, we classified all potential adopters into broad types. Employees were sorted into a hierarchy of Associates, Vice-3 We exclude from our analysis 300 employees who left the firm during our sample period.
Presidents, Directors, and Managing Directors. Depending on their job title within the firm, employees were also assigned to one of four functions they performed in the bank:
Administration, Research, Sales, and Trading. Finally, employees were sorted into four broad geographical locations: Asia, Britain, Europe, and the US. 4 The combination of these classifications results in all employees being sorted into one of 64 groupings. The right panel of Figure 6 shows the average volume of monthly calls by rank over time.
Call volumes differ across types, for example, Vice Presidents make more calls on average than Directors. Though the data is noisy, call volume appears to grow each month. This is intuitive given that there are more potential receivers for an employee to call later on. This gives weak evidence of a "network effect," in the sense that intensity of use of the technology is growing the number of adopters.
Theoretical Model
We construct a theoretical model to provide a utility-based foundation that can rationalize variation in adoption rates and calling patterns across and within types of employees.
We characterize the adoption decision as an optimal waiting problem, with each employee joining the videoconferencing network when the expected benefits of adoption exceed the opportunity cost of non-adoption. Our model is dynamic because each employee computes the expected benefit of joining the network as a sum of utility flows accruing from future network use. This utility flow critically depends on expectations about growth of the installed base. There are three basic ingredients to the model: a set of state variables describing whether each employee has adopted at a given time, payoffs which accrue to each employee as a function of the state variables and their actions, and the process governing changes in the state space over time. We discuss each of these components in turn.
State Space and Timing
The state space s describes which employees have adopted the technology. Each element of the state space, s it , is an indicator function representing each employee i adopts by month t. Employees face an infinite time horizon and discount their payoffs with the same discount factor, β = 0.9.
Each employee is endowed with a set of characteristics which describe their role in the firm, that are both exogenous and time invariant. We denote the vector of characteristics of employee i by: 
Per-Period Payoffs: Communications utility
In each period, an employee who has adopted the technology makes as many videoconferencing calls as she desires to any other employees in the network. To capture the benefits of these interactions, we propose a model which generalizes the standard discrete-choice utility maximization framework from a single choice to a sequence of interdependent choices.
The basic building block of our calling model is the utility that an employee receives from making a call to another employee, given whom they have already called in that month.
7 Formally, we model the utility employee i obtains from making the k-th call in a calling sequence to employee j as a function of both caller and receiver characteristics and the set of previous calls already made in that month.
This connection utility is defined as:
This utility function is composed of three parts: a static connection utility, δ 1 ; a dynamic component, δ 2 that depends on the set of previous calls made in the current period; and an idiosyncratic error term, ijk that is distributed Type-I extreme value with unit variance.
The utility of not making a call is normalized to zero. 
Intuitively, the Γ function zeros out all the interaction terms which are not relevant for the connection between two given employees. In the terminology of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), θ 2 Γ measures the "link synergy" between two types of employees. This is our first measure for a taste for diversity in the network composition, as connection utilities between groups may vary considerably. For example, the connection utility between two Managing Directors in Administration may be much higher than the utility between a Managing Director in
Administration and an Associate in Trading. The constant θ 1 determines a baseline utility that influences how many calls a given employee will make in any period.
The second component of the utility function, δ 2 , reflects the dynamic changes to the utility of a connection as the employee makes additional calls. The first component, θ 3 η j , reflects the intuition that employees may value "dynamic diversification" or the ability to call a variety of people within a month. For example a Managing Director in Administration may find it valuable to call a number of Directors in different geographic areas before making a change in policy. We account for the number of previous calls to a characteristic within a sequence using the function η j which is a 12×1 vector counting the number of times employee i has made calls to each of the 12 possible employee characteristics. The term θ 3 η j captures these effects by allowing the marginal utility of calling employee j to depend on the number of previous calls to other employees with similar characteristics. The second component of δ 2 , θ 4 (k − 1), shifts the marginal utility of making any calls linearly in the number of calls previously made in the current month. This captures the idea that the opportunity cost of using the videoconferencing technology is increasing due to the need to attend to other work-related activities.
This model of calling utility generates three of sources of variation within and across sequences for different types of employees. First, relative differences in connection utilities between employees depends on the type of the caller and receiver, implying different groups of employees in the firm can have different calling patterns in who they call. Second, the dy-namic diversification terms in δ 2 generate variation within a calling sequence, as the marginal utility of calling the same employee type changes in the number of times an employee has previously called other employees with similar characteristics. Third, differences in the levels of connection utilities across employee types imply that call volumes may differ across groups.
The objective of each employee in the network is to find the sequence of calls which maximizes overall utility:
where Ω denotes the set of calls made in this month. Each employee makes calls until the best marginal call has a negative utility. is driven by order statistics: the expected value of the maximum over random utilities is increasing in the number of potential receivers. Therefore, the more employees there are in a network, the higher the number of expected calls, even if they all share the same type. This is the underlying causal foundation of the standard reduced-form network effects model, where the usefulness of a network good is found to increase in the number of adopters, without having to assume that the number of adopters directly enters the utility function.
Transitions Between States: Technology Adoption
The second component of our model is whether employees who are outside the network adopt. At the beginning of each period, every employee who has not already adopted the videoconferencing technology can do so. Adoption is instantaneous and the employee is able to make calls immediately. We assume that it is not possible to divest the technology. This seems reasonable, given that the option value of holding the technology is always positive in our model, and we did not observe any divestitures in our data.
If an employee adopts, she can expect to use that technology to communicate with others in the network, both today and in the future. We can write the value function for each potential adopter as:
where expectations are taken with respect to that employee's beliefs about how the network is going to evolve in the all future periods. As in Farrell and Saloner (1985) , the benefits of adopting the videoconferencing technology consist of both the network benefit derived from the stream of expected discounted calling utilities, E [U (Ω it ) + βV i (s t+1 ; s i,t+1 = 1)], and the stand-alone benefits (such as watching television), denoted by τ i . The stand-alone benefit varies across employees and is private information. If the employee does not adopt the technology, she receives the expected discounted continuation value. The employee solves an optimal waiting problem, adopting the technology when the benefits exceed the opportunity cost of adopting in a future period.
The cost of adopting the technology to the employee are the time spent setting it up and learning how to use it. The firm bears all monetary costs. To reflect this installation cost, we assume that adopters have to pay a one-time up-front fixed cost of F i . F i is drawn from a distribution that is known to all employees. We assume that F i is time-invariant and the realized value is known only to the employee.
Without loss of generality, we set τ = 0, since the stand-alone benefits and adoption costs are not separately identified in the model. To see this, suppose that there were no network benefits but only stand-alone use benefits. Then employees will be indifferent to adoption if and only if:
For any τ i , we can find a F i such that the employee is indifferent to adoption. Therefore, without loss of generality, we will assume that τ = 0.
The employee makes predictions about the future evolution of the network. This expectation raises three important dynamic considerations. First, the employee may have a high draw on F i . An employee with a large large F i has an incentive to wait for the installed base s t to grow and cover the net fixed costs. Second, employees may anticipate that their adoption now may spur other employees to adopt in future periods. Farrell and Saloner (1985) explain how this forward-looking behavior may help reduce the coordination failure.
Forward-looking behavior could just nudge inframarginal non-adopters towards adoption without visible effect, or it could potentially generate an entire cascade of adoptions. Third, employees receive option value from postponing adoption. Even though all employees have rational expectations about the expected evolution of the network, the presence of private information in the fixed costs of joining the network implies variance in who actually joins in any period. The resolution of this uncertainty over time creates the option value of delaying adoption.
Equilibrium and Network Evolution
Adoption in Equation 5 depends critically on each employee's beliefs about how the network is going to evolve in all future periods. The standard notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium obtains when all employees have beliefs which ensure that no employee has an incentive to change their action or beliefs in response. Without formally deriving any properties of the equilibria of our model, we note that such models typically involve a large set of admissible equilibrium beliefs. As is discussed in the next section, we do not need to solve for the equilibrium of our model in order to estimate its underlying structural primitives.
The most direct approach to estimating the unknown parameters of our model is to take a simulated method of moments approach. After specifying functional forms for the distribution of adoption costs and the calling utility function, we would search for parameters which made simulated moments from the model match their empirical counterparts as closely as possible. Such an approach requires solving the dynamic model of Section 3 for each iteration of a nonlinear optimization program. Unfortunately, the computational burden of this approach is astronomical, as we would have to solve for the fixed point of a system of 2 N interrelated equations, where N = 2, 169 is the number of employees in our sample. The sheer size of the state space makes it impossible to enumerate all the possible states of the network, let alone compute even one equilibrium.
To circumvent this problem, our empirical strategy follows the approach of Bajari et al. (2006a) , who advocate a two-step approach for estimating dynamic games. The intuition of their approach is that we can let the employees in the firm solve that dynamic program for us. Under the assumption that the employees optimize their adoption decision as in
Equation 5, we find parameters such that their observed behavior is optimal. In the first step, we recover reduced-form policy functions which describe the equilibrium strategies followed by each employee as a function of the state vector. In the second step, we project these functions onto our dynamic model of technology adoption choice and usage. In this manner, we recover consistent estimates of the underlying parameters which govern the process of network evolution and utilization.
There are two separate policy functions in the first stage. The first policy function addresses the question of how the network will be used by employees who have adopted the technology. We develop a "simulated sequence estimator" to estimate the calling utility parameters in Equation 4 defining how employees use the videoconferencing technology. The second reduced-form policy function estimates the factors that measure the propensity to join the network, given the number and composition of current users.
Simulated Sequence Estimator
Our goal is to estimate the utility calling parameters which govern how employees use the network once they adopt the videoconferencing technology. For a given calling sequence, Ω, of length K, the simulated sequence estimator splits the calling sequence problem into two parts by exploiting the following identity:
ln P r(Ω, K) = ln P r(Ω|K) + ln P r(K).
The simulated sequence estimator first estimates the composition of the call and then estimates the parameters which determine the number of calls. There are two reasons for separately estimating the parameters which govern which calls we make from the parameters which govern how many calls we make. The first reason is computational: the conditional probability of a calling sequence has a closed-form solution under our parametric assumptions, while the probability of a call length does not, and requires numerically costly simulation to calculate. The second reason is we have found that the estimator which estimates both sets of parameters jointly is badly biased in small samples. We provide Monte
Carlo evidence that our simulated sequence estimator performs well in small samples in the Appendix.
The assumption that the error term in Equation 2 is distributed type-I extreme value generates a logit probability of observing a call from employee i to employee j as the k-th call of a sequence:
Note that the outside option does not enter the probability of a call as it usually does in discrete choice models, as we are conditioning on the length of the sequence. Computationally, we find parameters to maximize the probability of observing each call in the sequence in that order. We use the order of calls within the sequence to identify the parameters governing the taste for dynamic diversification δ 2 , as the conditional probability of each call in the sequence depends on the calls made before it. Specifically, the relative frequency with which we observe two calls to the same subtype in a given sequence identifies δ 2 for that subtype.
We apply this estimator to all of the videoconferencing calls made by employees in this firm during the last three months of our data. Formally, the first step of our estimator is defined by the following maximization:
The second step in the simulated sequence estimator recovers the parameters which govern the length of the sequences. To solve for these parameters, we use a simulated method of moments approach. We use the calling parameters we found in step one to generate N s independent calling sequences by repeatedly simulating the process defined in Equation 4 for each employee in each month for the installed base at any time. We then compute the expected sequence length by averaging over these simulated sequences:
where |Ω itm (s t ; θ 1 , θ 4 )| is the length of the m-th simulated calling sequence for employee i in month t. We then perform the following minimization program:
Intuitively, we find parameters such that we match the length of observed calling sequences against the sequence lengths predicted by the process in Equation 4. Estimation of these parameters is straightforward. Since θ 4 does not enter the utility function for the first call, the intercept, θ 1 , is identified by the proportion of employees who do not make any calls in that period. Once the intercept is known, variation in the length of employees' calling sequences identifies θ 4 , since they have different expected utilities of making a marginal call.
Estimating adoption
The second policy function that we recover from the data governs the choice of videoconferencing technology adoption. We estimate the proportion of adopters of employee type m as a function of current and lagged state variables:
where x m is defined in Equation 1, ν t is a 12 × 1 vector enumerating the counts of employee characteristics currently present in the installed base, and the operator ⊗ represents elementwise multiplication.
The functional form of this policy function is guided by our model of adoption. First, we allow for the possibility that different employee groups in the firm have different propensities to join the network, as captured by λ 1 . Second, we have assumed that the fixed cost of adoption is employee-specific private information that is time-invariant. In conjunction with the fact that expected calling utility is weakly increasing in the size of the network, this assumption implies that the proportion of people within an employee type who adopt is nondecreasing in the size of the network. Therefore, we restrict the coefficients on these state variables, λ 2 , to be positive. Third, we include lagged state variables to correct for selection. The intuition is that, all else equal, the larger the network was in the last period, the higher the net fixed costs employees who are still outside the network in this period must have. We can imagine a thought experiment where we exogenously increase the size of the network in the last period. Employees who are on the margin of adoption will be induced to join the network, while those with higher net fixed costs will not. This implies that agents in future periods have systematically higher draws on net fixed costs than other employees from their group who decided to adopt in previous periods. We capture this effect by including one-month lagged state variables, and restrict the coefficients on these state variables, λ 3 , to be negative.
Estimating Net Fixed Costs of Adoption
Once we have estimated the policy functions governing adoption and use of the videoconferencing technology, it is possible to estimate the net fixed costs of adoption. Rearranging
Equation 5, the necessary and sufficient condition for adoption is:
We assume that F i is normally distributed with mean µ and variance σ 2 , with associated cumulative distribution function Φ(x; µ, σ 2 ). Therefore, the probability that employee has a draw of F i low enough to induce adoption is:
With exception of the mean and variance parameters of Φ(·), the terms in Equation 15 are either known or computable. We can calculate P r(adopt i ), the empirical probability of adoption, from Equation 13. The first set of policy functions gives an estimate of U (Ω it ), the expected calling utility, for any configuration of the network. The second set of policy functions describe how that network evolves over time as a function of current and lagged state variables. In combination, these policy functions allow us to simulate the evolution of the network and compute EV i (s t+1 ; s i,t+1 = 1), the expected present discounted utility of joining the network in this period.
Computing the expected value of not joining the network in this period is a little more involved. In principle, one needs to solve out an infinite series of nested dynamic programming problems, starting at a time infinitely far in the future and working backward, solving
Equation 5 at each point in time. However, suppose there is a month T at which the network has stopped growing. We can compute EV i (s T ) because adoption depends on whether or not the expected benefits of joining the network exceed F i . When the network does not grow then employees have no reason to delay adoption until a future period; an employee either adopts now or never adopts. This terminal value then allows us to solve the value function backwards to the current time period, approximating EV i (s t ). This seems reasonable because most uncertainty about the evolution of the system has been resolved by period 10;
we use this time horizon in computing the continuation value of not joining in the current period.
To recover the parameters underlying the distributions of net fixed costs, we estimate Equation 15 by forming the following moment:
We index µ and σ 2 by m to emphasize that we estimate the fixed cost distributions separately for each type of employee in the firm. The identification of these parameters is straightforward: µ is identified off of the percentage of employees who join the network at t = 0, and σ is identified by the rate at which subsequent employees join as the network grows.
Multiple Equilibria
A central challenge for the network effects literature is dealing with multiple equilibria. One advantage of our empirical approach is that we recover the equilibrium actually played in the data. Furthermore since employees make choices within a single network, it follows that only one equilibrium is being played. To our knowledge, this is unique among applications of the BBL framework, as we do not have to confront the possibility of multiple equilibria across markets, as in Ryan (2006) .
Identification
Data on ex-post usage allows us to measure payoffs. This gives us the freedom to use when an employee adopts the technology to trace out the distribution of net fixed adoption costs for their group. To calibrate how the composition of the network affects payoffs we use a similar identification idea and exploit call data on both the number and composition of calls. We use differences in the static composition of calls across types to identify connection synergies between types. We then use changes in the composition of these calls over the sequence of calls that each employee makes to identify decay rates. Variation in the total number of calls across types allows us to determine base utility and the overall disutility of marginal calls.
Results
This section reports estimates for parameters for the utility from making calls. We also report estimates for the distribution of the net fixed costs of adoption that govern the transition between states in our model. Table 3 illustrates that with the exception of UK-based employees, who prefer to call other employees from Europe, employees prefer to call other employees within their region. Given that this within-region propensity is larger for employees in the US and Asia, we speculate that the propensity to call within-regions could be influenced by time zones. Employees' work hours in the US and Asia barely overlap, but the work hours of British and European employees do. Table 4 illustrates that employees, on average, exhibit a preference for calling employees in similar functions to themselves -the average employee prefers to communicate with someone within their own functional group than outside it. Given the perception that the research, sales and trading functions should support each other in a banking environment, it is also striking that all such employees prefer to call administrators rather than anyone in one of their sister functions. This might reflect the fact that the videoconferencing is an internal firm technology, and that employee compensation is based on the ability to sell, research and trade financial products for outside clients, rather than communicating information to each other.
Call Utilities
Most of the theoretical literature on hierarchies and firm organization pose abstract models of why the need to process information may lead a firm to organize itself into a hierarchy. See for example Garicano (2000), Radner (1992) , Radner (1993) , Van Zandt (1999), and Wernerfelt (2004) . These theories predict that communication in a firm will be predominantly directed up and down a hierarchy. By contrast, our results on calling preferences across the hierarchy in 5 suggest a more nuanced pattern of communication.
Managing Directors are most likely to call each other and less likely to call employees further down the ladder of command. Other employees appear to have similar preferences for calling other employees in similar positions in the hierarchy or one step above them. However, they are less likely to call employees either lower in the hierarchy than they are or a step removed above them in the hierarchy. These results augur against the technology being used successfully for monitoring, but instead suggest that it is being used to exchange information about tasks assigned to one layer of the hierarchy or occasionally gathering information from a superior one rung up in the hierarchy.
One of the auxiliary aims of this paper is to provide some empirical evidence on communication patterns within a firm. Lack of data has meant that most of the literature on hierarchies and firm organization is theoretical. The estimates presented in tables 6 through 5 have an advantage over existing empirical research on the organization of firms such as Rajan and Wulf (2006) and Garicano and Hubbard (2003) , namely that we study and model actual communication flows. This means that we are able to provide evidence on whether hierarchies are fulfilling the communications role assigned to them by theory. The obvious caveat is that to get this level of detail in data (like Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994)), we must study the internal communications using one technology in one firm.
The results for the parameterθ 3 which captures the role of the dynamic decay rates are displayed in Table 6 . The taste for dynamic diversification is strong. The decay rates are large enough to have a significant effect at the margin of calling the same group twice in a row, especially with respect to employees at the associate level, employees in research, and employees in Asia. We speculate that this reflects the fact that these employees are more on the periphery of the firm and that their roles are more to provide one-time information than engaging in consistent exchange of information.
Net Fixed Costs of Adoption
Tables 7 through 10 display the results of our fixed cost estimates. There are a few patterns to highlight. What is striking is how costs of adoption vary across the hierarchy and function in the four regions. For example, generally we see declining fixed costs of adoption as we move up the hierarchy, with managing directors having the lowest net costs of adoption.
However, in Europe we see that managing directors actually had the highest net fixed costs of adoption. We speculate that this is because the managing directors with the greatest operational responsibilities tended to be located in Europe and as a result the value of their time was high. On average, we see that employees in the US and Asia had the highest net fixed costs of adoption, but that in these countries administrators have lower net costs of adoption. We speculate that this reflects the fact that these administrators occupied positions which tended to be more peripheral to the central working of the bank and that their time costs were lower as a result.
If we compare these results with the results for calling choices in Tables 3 through 5 , we see that it is not the case that the employees whom most employees preferred to call had the lowest net fixed costs of adoption. Instead, in the case of Managing Directors of Research in the Europe, while callers received high utilities from calling them, they also had some of the relatively highest fixed adoption costs 9
One powerful benefit of the reduced-form approach is that we implicitly capture and model correlations in adoption in clusters which are the result of ad-hoc managerial coordination. However, we do not control for unobserved heterogeneity in the form of shocks which are common across groups of individuals, e.g. all employees who are in Administration and also located in Asia. Carr (2003) documents that the typical company spends 3.7 percent of its revenues on IT. A challenge for managers is to ensure that their employees actually use the firm's technology investment to its full advantage. The videoconferencing context that we study is unusual because adoption was decentralized to employees. A far more common challenge facing IT managers is how to get employees to start using a costly technology which has already been installed for them. The focus of our policy experiments, therefore, is how best to encourage actual interactions using a new IT technology. Consequently, in our discussion, we interpret "adoption" in our data as the equivalent of the more general idea of "activation," the active usage of a new technology by an employee.
As discussed by Liebowitz and Margolis (1994) , network owners can prevent coordination failure if they offer targeted incentives to reflect the network benefits to network participants brought by new adopters. In the presence of network effects which are heterogenous in interactions, however, the optimal policy is more complex, because each potential network entrant should be compensated for the varying positive network effects they have for a large set of different users. Since firms rarely engage in personalized subsidies and the information burden of an optimal policy would be large, we evaluate two possible "rule of thumb" technology management policies: a targeted policy where a single subtype joins the network, and a uniform policy where a few employees from every subtype join the network.
The intuition here is that the firm will install the physical hardware and provide whatever training is necessary to overcome the net fixed costs of adoption for a selected set of employees under each policy.
The first policy we consider is where the firm picks one subtype to adopt/test the technology first. This resembles the way that many firms roll out new IT technologies. IT managers usually pick this initial seed from employees who are similar by virtue of their operational similarity and location. Therefore we conduct a policy experiment where the starting network is seeded with all 112 research associates located in the US. This group constitutes the single largest subtype within the firm, and may be considered a natural place to seed the network, as employees in the US generally have high adoption costs.
The second policy takes a diffuse approach to adoption. Here the firm spreads 112
installations across the entire set of subtypes. The idea here is that diversity increases the value of the network, and that seeding the initial network with a broad range of types may most efficiently jump-start the growth of the network. Given there are 64 subtypes, there are 16 groups which start with only one employee. We choose the last 16 types who all located in the US.
In each counterfactual simulation, we start by seeding the initial network in accordance with the desired policy. Starting at time zero, the network is then simulated forward for fifty months. This amount of time is sufficient to allow the network to achieve the steady state where it is no longer growing at a significant rate. Also, the discounted present value of utility of months more than 50 periods from now is essentially zero for the discount rate of 0.9 that we use. To simulate the evolution of the network, we draw uniform random variables for each potential adopter, and check these against each employee's corresponding subtype-specific policy function. If the policy function indicates that the employee will join the network, we draw a sunk entry cost from the associated truncated normal distribution.
After determining the evolution of the network in that period, we then calculate the sum of expected utilities for all employees in the network. This calculation is simplified by the fact that it is possible to do this on a subtype basis, rather than employee by employee. The results of the two policy experiments and a baseline comparison against the empty starting network are shown in Table 11 . Figures 7, 8 and 9 contrast the results graphically for the total adoption, calls and average utility.
The first comparison is across the average number of phone calls. Across each specifica-tion, the undiscounted average number of calls in each month is roughly similar, with slightly higher amounts in the baseline and targeted policy than in the uniform policy.
The maximum number of adopters is considerably higher in the targeted case than in the baseline or uniform cases which have identical outcomes. This occurs because other employees find it valuable when this group adopts but the group's high net fixed costs of adoption prevent them from adopting without policy intervention. Consequently targeting this group has the largest impact on employees' adoption both directly and because it changes expectations about how the network will evolve. The results for the uniform policy suggest that a broad-based adoption process may be highly inefficient, since it doesn't target employees with high net fixed costs of adoption and consequently does not alter expectations of how the network will evolve.
We calculate the expected discounted monthly utility for each subtype across the three policies. Both the mean utility for the population of employees and for the upper and lower quartiles suggests that uniform policy improves net utility over the baseline case. This reflects the taste for diversity in the network which is apparent in the decay rates reported in table 6.
However, the utility for employees which results from the targeted policy is higher still.
Targeting increases present discounted utility by over 9% (discounted at β = 0.9) for the mean type. This increase is also reflected across the other quartiles of the utility distribution.
If the objectives of the firm are positively related to the utility of the employees, then this policy can have a significantly positive effect from the firm's perspective. In addition the utility gains appear to shift the utilities equally across subtypes in the firm, even in the targeted case. This illustrates that in this setting, the utility benefits of changing the number of people in the network by targeting those with high net fixed costs outweigh trying to encourage diversity in the network.
The last two panels in the table illustrate inter-temporal differences in adoption rates and network usage. We assume that, everything else being equal, the firm would prefer to have a given number of phone calls or employees in the network sooner rather than later.
We report the discounted sums of users who have adopted the network in a month and the number of calls they have made, using two contrasting potential monthly discount rates for the firm. The differences are quite stark: the uniform policy makes marginal improvements over the baseline case, while the targeted policy dominates along both dimensions. When β = 0.9, user counts increase by 25% and calls increase by 23%. In an investment bank where the opportunity cost of time is high, these results suggest that the dominating policy is to target a specific group for initial adoption.
We have assumed, however, throughout this discussion that it is costless for the firm to place employees in the installed base in the first period, and that such policies can be accomplished by fiat without any compensation towards the employees concerned. If employees had to be compensated, the targeted policy would prove more expensive to the firm relative to more diffuse policies merely because of the higher net fixed costs involved in the targeted policy.
Conclusion
This paper bridges an older literature that explained s-curve diffusion patterns by user heterogeneity, and a newer literature on network effects that emphasizes the interdependence of technology adoption. We estimate a forward-looking model of technology adoption and usage that explicitly models heterogeneity over adoption costs, network effects and usage behavior. We estimate this model using unusually detailed data on 463,806 calls made after the introduction of a videoconferencing technology in a large investment bank. We quantify how different types of heterogeneity affect network evolution and use, and analyze two common policies which are used to jump-start network technology diffusion. We find evidence that in this case it was better to cater towards employees' taste for diversity, by explicitly targeting a group with high net fixed costs of adoption and that had a large impact on expectations about network size and evolution, as opposed to policies more explicitly geared to ensuring diversity in the network.
A Monte Carlo Evidence
To evaluate the efficacy of our estimation approach, we ran a simple Monte Carlo experiment.
The results, along with the true parameters, are shown in Tables 1 and 2 . The Monte Carlo evidence suggests that our estimator precisely estimates the calling parameters, even including the decay rates.
We discovered that the performance of the single-step estimator was poor even for large samples in the Monte Carlo. The intuition behind this is clear when considering the identification of the two-step approach. In the first step we estimate connection utilities and their decay rates. The connection utilities are identified off even just one call, as the probability of making a call between types reveals the magnitude of the connection synergy once we have normalized the error term. The decay rates are then identified from within-sequence variation in the ordering of the calls-having called a certain type in the past, the conditional probability of calling that type in the future, holding connection utilities constant, depends on the decay rate. By comparing those conditional probabilities across a large sample of calls, we can precisely identify the decay rates jointly with the connection utilities.
With these connection parameters in hand, we can estimate the parameters which govern the length of calling sequences. The identification of the intercept and decay parameter governing how fast utility decreases as a function of the number of calls is a bit subtle. In infinite samples, the intercept is identified off the frequency of calling sequences with no calls.
The reason for this once we know the calling parameters is it possible to put a probability that no one makes a call as a function of the intercept. All else equal, a higher intercept leads to a lower set of sequences with no calls in a period. Once the intercept is identified from this probability, it is straightforward to match the decay slope parameter to the average number of calls that a type makes. We find that two-step process works well in the Monte
Carlos we have run.
Since our two-step method is inefficient, we explored a one-step method that subsumes the probability of not making a call into the likelihood of observing a given sequence of calls.
The issue with this approach is not econometric-in infinite samples the same identification arguments as above can be made in the simultaneous setting. Rather, the problem is practical. In a finite sample the intercept is going to be poorly identified off of sequences with zero calls if the model suggests this happens infrequently. Given that the intercept is poorly identified, doubling both the intercept and decay slope parameters give similar empirical predictions, as both parameterizations give the same number of average calls in simulations.
The difference is that the variance of calls around that average is estimated incorrectly;
with enough noise in the data, the estimator cannot discern between the truth and linear transformations of the true intercept and slope parameters. In Monte Carlos we performed, we obtained suites of estimates which were all biased upward roughly by a factor of two.
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Therefore, despite the loss of efficiency, we estimate the model in two steps.
One additional drawback of the two-step method is that the second step involves matching sequence lengths against predicted lengths. With a finite number of simulated sequences our objective function has flat spots, a well-known problem from the discrete choice literature. A simple fix to this problem is the use the Laplace-type estimator of Chernozhukov and Hong (2003) , a method using Markov Chain Monte Carlo techniques to help perform inference on objective functions with local minima and flat spots.
10 Results available upon request from the authors. 
